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Europe’s identity is not just contested. It is contested in specific terms, namely which set of properties 
(values, heritage, or vocation) would uniquely identify Europe? Major ramifications allegedly follow 
from whatever stance taken in this debate, e.g. with regard to external relations (should the Union 
come to include Turkey?) and internal institutionalisation (is there a European demos?). Without 
exception, these arguments derive from representations of Europe’s past. This paper challenges this 
common bias, taking a cue from Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between ‘Europe en représentation’ and 
‘Europe en acte’. It does so by tracking, firstly, how the narrative of Europe’s past vanishes into a myth 
that we cannot represent but also cannot cut loose from. Secondly, it revisits the incisive critique of a 
representationalist view on Europe which Nietzsche confronted us with. Here I first address Nietzsche’s 
explicit, but scattered, notes; then I explore how the same themes are played out in what I consider 
to be one of the greatest novels on ‘Europe’ of the 20th century, Musil’s The Man without Qualities). 
Thirdly, the paper argues that the alternative reading of identity in terms of ‘Europe en acte’ allows 
us to deploy the myth of Europa in prospect rather than retrospect, to bear in mind the multiple ways 
in which various polities within European lost their innocence, and to stand united in an attitude of 
prudence with regard to at least three major praxeis of the future: technology, economics and the rule 
of law. Hence, shared selfhood rather than shared sameness should inspire the terms of the identity 
debate.
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1. By way of a preface
There are many reasons to congratulate the 
Law School of the Siberian Federal University on 
its 60th anniversary. One of these is its openness 
towards the idea of law as a transnational rather 
than a national concern. Another is its interest in 
academic disciplines adjacent to law such as social 
sciences and humanities. That these two qualities 
form the helices of the Law School’s DNA becomes 
particularly (though not exclusively) visible in 
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the Comparative Law Department of the School, 
where I have always found a curious, critical, and 
hospitable environment of students and faculty. 
For that I would like to add my gratitude to my 
congratulations.
This special issue celebrates the anniversary 
of the Law School by exploring some links 
between law and humanities, and by refuelling 
close relationships between colleagues from East 
and West in this area, that have come to flourish 
over recent decades. The much appreciated 
invitation to contribute a paper came to me on 
the ominous 14th of July, 2014, the day of the 
MH17 crash over East-Ukraine, in which 298 
innocent people died. Among them were my near 
colleague Willem Witteveen, his wife Lidwien 
Heerkens and their daughter Marit. An expert in 
legal theory, in particular law and literature, and 
founding father of the Liberal Arts Programme 
at Tilburg University, Witteveen was ‘law and 
humanities’ in the flesh. An academic and a 
senator, he was also an ardent defender of the 
rule of law as a global concern. Therefore, I take 
liberty to dedicate this essay to his memory, 
knowing that he would have encouraged me, as 
well as our East-going colleagues over the years1, 
to maintain the academic links with SFU, in spite 
of the growing concerns emerging, as we speak, 
in our Western countries about some major 
policy decisions of the Russian Federation, both 
internal and external. We in the West wonder, 
indeed, how, for instance, the Federation would 
defend the occupation of Crimea in view of its 
responsibility as a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council; or how it 
would compare the investigations procedures to 
identify, respectively, who brought down MH17, 
and who attacked Airbus A321 over Egypt’s 
Sinai desert in October 2015, killing 224 people; 
or how it would see the core of democracy in 
relation to freedom of speech for those who 
severely criticise the parties and powers in 
office. Witteveen would trust that these concerns 
would be no secret to our Russian colleagues 
and students, and he would have challenged us 
to discuss them in all openness. But he would 
also acknowledge that such discussions require 
an attitude of mutual confidence and honesty 
between East and West.
In this paper2 I hope to be responsive to 
Willem Witteveen’s appeal, in a self-critical 
vein, by scrutinising the ways in which we in the 
West ask about Europe’s identity. I propose to 
ask the question about the identity of a continent 
that lacks a border to the East, where it vanishes 
into Russia; only no one knows where. Indeed, 
I am going to revisit, from a philosophical point 
of view, the common phrase of Europe as an 
appendix, or a large peninsula, of Asia.3 Only 
from such an investigation, I venture, will we be 
able to discover what we are talking about when 
we express concerns regarding, e.g., ‘European’ 
(or, for that matter, ‘Asian’) values, democracy 
‘deficits’, ‘transboundary’ legal developments, 
etc..
2. Ereb and arab
Could it be true? A rather simple etymology4 
would allegedly derive the name ‘Europa’ from 
an old root that consists of a pair of consonants 
(rp or rb). These would have been vocalised in 
two different ways. One would use a high vowel 
e, the other one a deep vowel a. This vocalisation 
would have made these sounds apt for indicating 
contrasting pairs. Similar to our saying ‘ping-
pong’, ‘cat and dog’, or ‘tit for tat’, people in 
the old times would have used erp and arb or, 
slightly stretched, erep and arab. It could have 
been indexicals to point to regions, generously, 
with a wide arm gesture: yonder and yonder. And 
what else would have constituted the difference 
between these two horizons than the most 
pertinent difference to be made on earth wherever 
one has chosen to dwell: the land where the sun 
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sets and the land where the sun rises? Too good, 
perhaps, to be true.
However, if we embark on a description 
of European culture with these etymological 
surmises in the background, a disturbing order of 
things begins to take form. The issue of solemn 
names, for instance: Europe as the Occident, 
the ‘Night Land’, the ‘First World’. It is quite 
obvious that erep-land could only have been the 
Night Land and arab-land the Morning Land. 
For that part of the globe – America – where 
Europe would become the oriental Morning Land 
and Arabia the occidental Night Land was yet 
unknown to the word wizards of these ancient 
times. It is equally obvious that Europe was 
bound to become ‘the First World’. For it is a well-
corroborated phonological law that high-pitch 
vocalisation precedes low-pitch, presumably to 
burden our acoustic senses by alerting them one 
step at the time. We easier hear, and therefore say, 
‘ereb and arab’ than ‘arab and ereb’, for the same 
reason as we prefer to say ‘ping-pong’ rather than 
‘pong-ping’. The high-pitch vocalisation is more 
suitable to awaken our ears and attract focussed 
attention to what follows, where the low-pitch 
one would make the light vowels disappear in its 
acoustic shadow.
Interesting as it may be in its own right, the 
matter of names is not the most important one. 
More fascinating is the following observation. 
If we try to frame a retrospect of our cultural 
history we are able to point, with great certainty, 
to the place where these words ereb and arab 
must have made their first sense. Seen from the 
present situation there can have been only one 
area in the Ancient World, where ereb could 
stand for what is now, roughly, Europe and arab 
for what in our days is the Arabian World. There 
can have been only one topos from where we 
point to Europe if we refer to the land where 
the sun sets and to Arabia if we turn to the land 
of the sunrise. This topos is to be found at the 
easterly coast of the Mediterranean Sea, the old 
Phoenician shores.
By a felicitous coincidence, mythology 
comes to underscore etymology on this point. 
Most of us will be familiar5 with the old Greek 
narratives telling that Europa was the name of 
the pretty daughter of a Phoenician king. Zeus 
kidnapped her when she was playing with her 
friends in the fields near that east shore. He 
appeared before her in the guise of a white bull. 
Playful as she was, she gradually turned from 
her friends to this magnificent animal6, began 
to decorate his head with flowers and eventually 
mounted his white back. The bull started running 
towards the sea. He splashed into the water with 
his rider. Together they drifted westbound. They 
must have looked right into the setting sun. Why? 
Well, otherwise the girls would not have been 
playing there! In these regions evening is the time 
to find a bit of cool air at the beach, to rest and to 
play.7 When they arrived at the isle of Crete, bulls’ 
island indeed, and as west of the Phoenician shore 
as can be, the tables are turned. Now it is Zeus’s 
turn to mount a white back. He rapes the young 
woman near a source, symbol of fertility, and 
leaves her behind in distress. The myth concludes 
with Aphrodite coming to comfort Europa and to 
promise her that once a whole continent will bear 
her name.
Such is, in rough outline, the narrative 
in which the history of Europe vanishes. It is, 
perhaps, an all too emphatic support of the 
hazardous etymology that we applied on the few 
letters of that name. We may feel uneasy about 
the love of ostentation that is so quick to make 
etymology and mythology conflate. Would we 
not rather spend our wit to the real problems 
Europe has to face? But if we would turn our head 
from so intellectual a posture, and if we would 
try to focus on the real issues in contemporary 
Europe, we would still be looking at the eastern 
coast of the Mediterranean. We would ascertain, 
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with a heavy heart, that it is there, near these very 
shores of the Mediterranean, where Europe’s 
identity is still a cause of serious battle, often in 
the literal sense of the word. It is hardly necessary 
to mention examples. In ever so many discussions 
about the broadening of the European Union, 
political protagonists find themselves in opposite 
camps regarding the possible candidature of 
Turkey. Although Turkish soccer clubs are 
welcome to join the European Champions League, 
our politicians are very reluctant to let Turkey 
participate in the project of a united Europe. The 
sternest argument heard is not the economy, nor 
is it the doubtful situation of human rights and 
democracy in Turkey. It is, rather, the observation 
that Turkey is the representative, indeed the 
frontier soldier, of a different culture. Cynical 
as it may sound, Turkey’s poor performance 
in human rights and democracy is a welcome 
excuse, for the time being, to silence this much 
more categorical statement on culture. It will 
almost certainly be revisited as soon as human 
rights and parliamentary democracy in Turkey 
appear to improve. Turkey marks the culture that 
‘we’, Europeans, have repelled from the shores 
of Phoenicia during the great crusades. It is the 
culture that we have resisted when it threatened 
the gates of Vienna. It is the culture that cuts 
across Cyprus. It is the culture that turned the 
Balkan into a powder-barrel of violence. It caused 
the hills around Blace in northern Macedonia to 
mirror those of Goma in eastern Congo. In short, 
it is the arab-culture that the ereb-culture has to 
oppose for the simple reason that the two have 
always been face to face.8 
The same clash is brought on our retinas 
almost daily by yet another conflict on the 
Phoenician shore, where the far posts of the ereb- 
and the arab-culture contest each other’s claim 
on the land that the one calls Palestine and the 
other Israel. If one travels around in this region, if 
one manages to escape from the state authorised 
tourist places and to go one’s own way, it is not 
difficult to assess that here, on the Phoenician 
shore, people live on a political St Andrew’s 
crack. From the relatively safe corner of the 
western European world we can wonder how 
vehement the battle is over every acre of ground 
that could be occupied by one or the other of the 
two cultures clashing here.9 And, like in the case 
of the Balkan, Europe feels unable to interfere. 
Not so much because it is extremely difficult to 
establish who is in his right and who is not, but 
rather because we see ourselves reflected in this 
battle and realise that our ancient anti-Semitism 
was only moved to a different place.10 Should we 
not be prepared to admit that Europe was happy 
to let the survivors of the Shoah go to the frontier 
line of its culture: back to where they came from? 
If such questions emerge, it is perhaps time to 
acknowledge that there is more at issue than a 
scholastic exercise in etymology and mythology.
3. Nietzsche and Europe
Could we only learn to say ereb again if 
we meant Europe: yonder. Could we just point 
‘yonder’ in those sublime discourses on identity! 
Sublime and manifold as they may be these days, 
they are myopic to the point of narcism, rather 
than a longing gaze at the horizon. The urge to put 
the issue of identity on the agenda seems to have 
increased since ‘the fall of the wall’ (1989), the 
year when Europe became again what, in point of 
fact, it had always been: a continent that is little 
more than an appendix of Asia – as Nietzsche 
used to assert11; a continent that misses one border 
and, thus, does not know where it ends. In our day 
it would seem that the quest for Europe’s cultural 
identity is a prerequisite of any political enterprise 
claiming accountability. Thus, from the part of the 
advocates of transparent European developments 
it often is the object of sincere concern. I refer, 
for example, to the carrefours, the round table 
conferences initiated by the former chairman of 
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the European Commission, Jacques Delors. ‘As 
the European institutions’, he asks, 
‘no longer express by themselves a dynamics 
palpable to the citizens, as the political 
mediations of our different countries are 
no longer designed to justify a long term 
project, is it not the task of philosophers, 
historians, political scientists and, indeed, 
also the representatives of the sciences, 
to indicate a direction for contemporary 
Europe?12
No one will dispute the relevance, or 
indeed the need, of an intense project of constant 
reflection by such a fine selection of distinguished 
scholars. But the very same quest for identity 
is also undertaken in order to stop the growth 
of transparency in European institutions. Then 
it serves the argument that where there is no 
European nation with its own identity, there 
can be, ultimately, no democratic credentials 
for European law, unless it is accepted by the 
national legislators of the Member States. I refer 
to the decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
on the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union.13 Not 
that I want to take issue with all the various lines 
of argument that compose this Lisbon-Judgment, 
some of which make perfect sense with regard 
to the well-known problem of the democratic 
deficit in the Union. But to understand what is in 
the background of this ruling one may want to 
read the lawyers responsible for its conceptual 
framework, like Paul Kirchhof and (even more 
revealing) Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider: in 
the name of democracy they persistently raise the 
topic of ‘natural homogeneity’ of the people as 
a necessary terminus a quo for a political order 
under the rule of law. The latter, towards the end of 
a thousand two hundred pages sustained exercise 
in legal philosophy, is not embarrassed at all to 
emphasise the ‘biological homogeneity’ of the 
Europeans and to express his high expectations 
that this, eventually, will form the basis of their 
transnational unity.14 One thing I learnt from 
my travels to Middle Siberia is that this is utter 
nonsense. Indeed, there are more subtle ways of 
regenerating racism. 
The revival of this political issue of identity 
during the last two decades is all the more 
remarkable as it seemed to have been ruled 
out shortly after the Second World War by the 
initiatives of economic co-operation. The odds 
were that the warrant of peace could not be found 
any longer in letting ‘the spirit of Europe’ range 
once more over the nations. Rather, a better world 
was expected to come from the technological 
organisation of a market for basic economic 
processes, common for member states only. This 
was not devised as a crude form of mercantilism. 
Well on the contrary, the market should be seen 
as a public good in itself; a good that could only 
exist if certain ways of acquiring or maintaining 
property, together with incentives of open 
competition, would be enforced by an overarching 
structure of legal power. Such power would be 
regarded, in one way or another, as sovereign. But, 
quite different from national state sovereignty, 
this power would hide, as it were, behind the 
ongoing processes of the market itself, where all 
the participants would be free to negotiate on an 
equal basis. Nevertheless, governmental power 
should be real and effective, to be exercised by 
Commission, Council and Court, as well as, 
though to a far lesser degree, by some form of 
parliamentarism. Thus, the whole project was 
marked off from an all too stylish Renaissance 
of ‘la douce commerce’. Am I saying, by pointing 
to the renewed growing appeal to an idea of 
European identity, that, at this point in time, we 
begin to realise that this project of piecemeal 
engineering has fallen victim to its own success 
in practice, or its fallacy in theory? and that the 
issue of identity has to come to its rescue after all? 
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It seems so, certainly in view of the risky Euro-
zone project; the upheaval caused by the influx 
of large numbers of undocumented immigrants; 
and the rapidly deteriorating relationship with 
the Russian Federation. It looks as if there is no 
point in having a single market without a single 
currency, and no single currency without a single 
ultimate source of political power; and no single 
source of power without a polity regarded itself 
as a bounded whole. But I also hesitate if this 
explanation suffices.
In the ‘90ties Francis Fukuyama made a 
best-seller with the old idea that this type of lucid 
liberalism constituted ‘the end of history’.15 He 
did not mean that the course of events in the world 
would come to an end. His thesis was, rather, 
that, from our time on, the meaning of events, 
whatever their nature, can be justifiably assessed 
from only one convincing perspective: whether 
they contribute to or carry away from what the 
market requires. Had he read Nietzsche, he would 
probably have approached the matter with more 
caution.16 Nietzsche pre-sensed that nothing 
would be able to stop the economical unification 
of Europe – and he abhorred it. Here are a few of 
his last and most visionary phrases17:
Die wirthschaftliche Einigung 
Europas kommt mit Nothwendigkeit – und 
ebenso, als Reaktion, die Friedenspartei ...
Das Ringen um einen Vorrang 
innerhalb eines Zustandes, der nichts taugt: 
diese Cultur der Großstädte, der Zeitungen, 
des Fiebers und der ‘Zwecklosigkeit’.
11[236]
Eine Partei des Friedens, ohne 
Sentimentalität, welche sich und ihren 
Kindern verbietet, Krieg zu führen; ver-
bietet, sich der Gerichte zu bedienen; 
welche den Kampf, den Widerspruch, 
die Verfolgung gegen sich herauf-
beschwört; eine Partei der Unterdrückten, 
wenigstens für eine Zeit; alsbald die große 
Partei. Gegnerisch gegen die Rach- und 
Nachgefühle.
Eine Kriegspartei, mit der gleichen 
Grundsätzlichkeit und Strenge gegen sich, 
in umgekehrter Richtung vorge hend -
This passage is one that is full of cynicism. 
Contrary to what one might think, Nietzsche is 
not warning against a belligerent party. What he 
worries about, rather, is a pacifist party established 
by economic forces. He warns against forces 
that had probably made themselves felt already 
in 1888, and that would take full effect in the 
course of the following century, ending exactly 
a hundred years later in 1989. In any event, he 
opposes the moral unison that, inevitably, will 
come in the tail of economic unification. Instead, 
he advocates a war party with the same cogent 
logic and discipline marching in the opposite 
direction: a party that does not make unity for its 
own sake sacrosanct and, thus, a party that steers 
away from Christian morality.
For Nietzsche, European Christian ‘morality’ 
is deeply perverse. As is well-known, it annoys 
him already in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft.18 It 
is a morality that wants to ban all contingency, 
all tentativeness, all conflict, in short: all 
heterogeneity.19 We Europeans, he says, are tired 
of difference. We, the good Europeans of today 
and tomorrow, are tired of man. This fatigue is the 
nihilism that Nietzsche wants to fight, although 
he has little hope of success. For that is precisely 
what is blurred: the memory of every form of 
difference, singularity and plurality:
‘A poet could say that God has put Oblivion 
as a guard at the doorstep of human 
dignity.’20
The European man, according to Nietzsche, 
has lost the awareness of what he has destroyed, 
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robbed and murdered in the name of human 
dignity. Now he empowers himself to reconstruct 
his history as moral progress, and the slightest 
sign of hesitation, let alone protest, as a contempt 
of his excellence. Once again:
‘Wer das Gewissen des heutigen Europäers 
prüft, wird aus tausend moralischen 
Falten und Verstecken immer den gleichen 
Imperativ herauszuziehen haben, den 
Imperativ der Heerden-Furchtsamkeit: 
'wir wollen, dass es irgendwann einmal 
nichts mehr zu fürchten gibt!' Irgendwann 
einmal – der Wille und Weg dorthin heisst 
heute in Europa überall der ‘Fortschritt’.21
The pagans of progress, the insolent ones, 
should be taught manners, indeed mores; that is 
what christian morality is after. To which end, 
they think, this morality, this clear cut distinction 
between good and bad, should be presented as a 
universal and eternal certainty22 that justifies both 
supreme violence and extreme cowardice. Who 
shall have the courage to resist it? And Nietzsche 
challenges us, Europeans: those who shall have 
the courage to depart from this morality, this 
self-appropriated self-confidence, and to reach 
beyond this premature distinction between good 
and bad, those shall become, in Nietzsche’s much 
abused idiom, Übermenschen.
Thus, Nietzsche abhorred the economic 
unification of Europe. But he abhorred it for a 
reason quite different from the worries vexing 
the authors of our times. They picture us, 
Europeans, as if we are on the verge of losing our 
culture by yielding to the pressure of economic 
developments. He, Nietzsche, believed this 
unification to be an inevitable outcome of a 
perversity in European culture. Thus, it is not 
something that European culture could be called 
to arms against, or even fall victim to. Those who 
oppose European culture and European economy 
(that is, the hard facts of uniformity, indifference, 
pollution and finally destruction), resemble the 
biblical character who wants to exorcise the devil 
by Beelzebub. For it is this very culture, this 
spirit of Europe or Europe as an idea, which is – 
as Nietzsche sees it – the root cause of economic 
unification. This spirit, eventually, will whiten all 
differences by erasing everything that is really 
different, from cheese to music, from agriculture 
to fine arts. The spirit of Europe takes issue, in 
particular, with everything that could be suspected 
to undermine the established distinction between 
good and bad. Even one who is not inclined to 
grant him prophetic talents will conceed that 
this Nietzschean account of our moral certainty 
might well provide the only explanation of our 
imperturbability under the nuclear, the ecological 
and the capitalist threats. Europe is the birthplace 
of the belief that it is good to exterminate man in 
the name of man, if necessary multiple times.
It is not easy to truly face Nietzsche’s 
challenge. Our first reaction is to squarely 
contradict him. We feel the urge to reassure each 
other that he was this biased pessimist who only 
would see the bad side of things; that, indeed, 
Europe has its good sides along with the bad ones, 
and that we can always learn from the mistakes 
of the past. In particular we want to stress that 
Europe derives its identity from the diversity of 
cultures and that opening up to that diversity will 
offer it precious chances for the future. These 
encouragements may keep the spirits high in 
everyday life. In point of fact, however, they are 
perfect demonstrations of what Nietzsche meant: 
the bourgeois belief in moral progress that appeals 
to ‘the jewish-christian tradition’ and ‘the Greek 
logos’ – or if one prefers the secular variant: the 
appeal to human rights and democracy. 
It is therefore necessary to be more precise 
about what it was that Nietzsche attacked. 
And because our spontaneous reaction will 
almost certainly be biased by our need of self-
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legitimation, we may welcome a more vivid 
picture of these biases, so as to recognise them 
quicker. Let us try and achieve this by turning 
to the literary character of Arnheim in Musil’s 
unfinished novel The Man Without Properties.
4. Arnheim as a European
One of the narrative lines in the first part 
of Musil’s novel concerns the fuzz about the so-
called Parallel Action. Ulrich, the main character 
of the novel, is ‘the man without properties’, i.e., 
he is not really committed to anything. He gets 
involved in this Action as a special secretary 
to a committee, consisting of half nobility, half 
bourgeoisie, that has charged itself with a grand 
plan. It is determined to outbid the upcoming 
Prussian celebration of Wilhelm II’s thirtieth 
anniversary as a king by a simultaneous (thus 
parallel) one year celebration of the seventieth 
anniversary of Kaiser Franz Joseph in the double 
monarchy of Austria and Hungary. Both the 
godfather and the godmother of this action engage 
in the most bragging of rhetorics to persuade 
all their social circles that there is need for one 
unifying idea that will found the whole of the 
action and be an epitome for the world at large. 
Soon enough, however, when it comes to grand 
ideas they have to hand over to a big captain of 
industry who, at the same time, is a philosopher 
in his own right. It is dr. Paul Arnheim, and he is 
a Prussian.
Arnheim is characterised23 as an enormously 
wealthy and powerful person, who nevertheless 
asserts to be permanently in search of the spiritual 
value of material life: ‘the unification of soul and 
economy’ (140). His overall goal is ‘to take ideas 
into spheres of power’. His Prussian origin is 
regarded as only a minor stain on his record. He 
is believed to be someone who is able to transcend 
nationalist scantiness. Yes, he is truly a European 
(226; 261). Thus, he incorporates a philosophy 
in which everything can be accommodated 
and ascribed a place. (231). He is someone who 
knows to speak of ‘the mystery of wholeness’ 
(251), someone also who is a great admirer of that 
other world-embracing provider of wholeness, 
the Catholic Church (242). In short, he is, totally 
committed, the antagonist of Ulrich. The latter 
is terribly annoyed by all these pretensions as 
they converge in one slogan that is of massive 
persuasive force for every politician, to wit that 
one must first be able to use power before one will 
be able to use power to the good.
Arnheim’s conception of culture, his 
Europeanism, converges into oppressing every 
trace of doubt, of heterogeneity and, above all, 
of contingency. He does not believe that, all of 
a sudden, something extraordinary can happen, 
something never heard of, something that baffles 
the mind and defies everyone's understanding. For 
him, it is self-evident that there is an undeniable 
‘meaning’ in life and that this overall meaning 
nourishes all categories that will serve us to 
book each and every state of affairs or course 
of events according to their ‘Sinngehalt’. There 
are assets and there are liabilities, the kind of 
accountability that is governed by accountancy; 
and that is all there is. ‘European’ in particular 
is his belief in a certain version of the principle 
of sufficient reason. – ‘In world history nothing 
happens without reason’, he says to Ulrich. – ‘But 
it does in the world’, Ulrich responds. – ‘In world 
history never!’, (225) Arnheim reassures him at 
their first meeting, apparently referring to the 
all-embracing Hegel. Ulrich however, Arnheim’s 
antipode, is a great believer in the principle of 
insufficient reason, which he amply explains to 
deputy bank director Leo Fischel.
If Arnheim is Nietzsche’s European in The 
Man Without Properties, can we then say that 
his antagonist, Ulrich, is the literary counterpart 
of the Übermensch? Many readers would assign 
that role to Clarisse. She is the fanatic half of a 
couple for whom Ulrich has some ambivalent and 
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rather superficial feelings. But he cannot follow 
Clarisse in her fascination with Moosbrugger, the 
murderer of several women, whose imprisonment 
forms another narrative line in the novel. This 
fascination, indeed, seems to carry her ‘beyond 
good and evil’; for who else would be on the 
side of someone who has done all these terrible 
things? An attentive reader would also notice 
that Ulrich gives Clarisse Nietzsche’s collected 
works as a present at her wedding. He would 
perhaps infer from this scene that ‘(…) she has 
so completely absorbed the Nietzschean message 
that she has made herself – as far as it is possible 
to translate a philosophical insight into a mode of 
living – an embodiment of Nietzsche’s “Will to 
Power”. She is obsessed with Nietzsche’s idea of 
the redemption of mankind by the chosen few.’24 
So Clarisse, rather than Ulrich, would be the 
Nietzschean Übermensch?
It could well be a premature interpretation. 
Ulrich’s gift could be an antidote to Clarisse’s 
doting, to fiddle a fashionable idiom. For who else 
than the true Nietzschean can give the collected 
works and say in an angelic voice: ‘Tolle, lege’ – 
Take and read? Who else than someone who 
truly understands these works can give them as 
a personal present? Is this not, indeed, always 
the implicit message behind every book that we 
give? And whom else could these works be given 
to than to someone who has still to learn the 
core of it, because she is inclined to subject her 
whole environment to her whimsical fanaticism? 
Indeed, we will see Clarisse, in the course of the 
book, consulting the works, rather than reading 
them. She wants to find instructions in them, as 
if Nietzsche’s text were an oracle25 or a recipe 
book.
No, there is certainly more similarity between 
Nietzsche’s cynicism and Ulrich’s resistance 
against Arnheim. Payne notes in his reflection on 
Musil: ‘Musil may have been thinking of Ulrich 
when he wrote in one of his manuscript notes: 
“Socratic is: to feign ignorance. Modern: to be 
ignorant!”(Tb [= Tagebücher, BvR], II, 736’.26 
And Nietzsche, as we know, hated Socrates as 
vehemently as he did Christian morality. We may 
conclude, therefore, that Ulrich comes closest 
to that man that Nietzsche has in mind when 
he referred to the man ‘hors catégorie’, the man 
beyond man, the Übermensch. The man beyond 
man is not superman. He is the man that will 
reach beyond Socrates, beyond the Greek, to 
the Phoenician shores. He is the man without 
qualities because he is pure potentiality. But this 
comes at a price: he is totally powerless. For this 
he will pay dearly.
5. Europe ‘en acte’
When we speak of the identity of Europe, 
we often speak like Arnheim: we want to bring 
ideas into spheres of power and advocate the 
convergence of economy and spirit. We reach 
to the Greeks, but not beyond Socrates. If we 
read the myth of Europa at all, we read it as a 
metaphor, a spiritual image that has not stopped 
‘speaking’ to us. But this is only because we 
find ourselves able to bring out its ‘meaning’, 
a meaning that we made sure to carefully store 
there long in advance. Our strategy is to map 
this identity on to an origin from which it all 
emerged. We habitually speak of the cradle of 
our civilisation and refer to the eastern shores 
of ancient Judaism, to the somewhat nearer 
ancient Greece, to the even closer ancient Rome. 
Then we are in fact home, as the remnants of 
the Roman Empire can be found quite far west, 
even in the Dutch Rhine delta or, for that matter, 
across the North Sea, in England. Indeed, new 
remnants are discovered on a regular basis, 
every time when we turn our spade to create so-
called new infrastructure. 
In this way, we tell the Europa myth in the 
form of a retrospective on the myth itself. We 
skip the myth as it were and turn directly to the 
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spirit behind the letters or the vocation behind 
the vowels. We tell ourselves a myth about this 
myth, as we believe ourselves to be able to reveal 
its ultimate sense and reference in the future. We 
imagine to be even beyond Aphrodite, knotting 
approvingly to her promise because we know how 
the story ends; namely with ‘us’. In retrospect, 
we emphatically say to ourselves, Europa came 
to the right place: to us and our idiosyncracies. 
Let me call this perspective on European identity 
a ‘vocational’ one, as it derives from the self-
dedication to an image of our own perfection. 
The whole of history is reconstructed to produce, 
as it were, this Europe, even though we are quick 
to admit that there have always been sustained 
efforts to undermine the road to perfection. This 
is why we have always had reasons to declare 
Europe in crisis, to fear it to be under siege, to 
defend it against an inimical world outside. 
Europe as the injured innocence, this reading of 
the myth is apparently obvious. But perhaps it is 
not the only one.
We could attempt a reading that clings on 
to the letters, in particular the vowels, of the 
proper name Europa and identify with her, this 
young, playful, adolescent girl. Let us follow 
the vowels as signposts to the actual narrative 
structure, rather than the spiritual meaning, of 
the myth. By that token, we acknowledge that 
the narrative is not about us in virtue of some 
mediating meaning that we can extract from or 
impose on it, but in virtue of its reflecting our 
role in it. Us is what the myth is all about rather 
than about: de te fabula narratur. We could 
try to conceive ourselves as Europa before we 
became Europe. We could imagine ourselves 
in Europa’s place and re-read the myth from 
this angle as we go through her experiences. 
We would become aware, gradually rather 
than retrospectively, to be fascinated, seduced, 
kidnapped, raped and impregnated by the Greek 
God and his infinite phallic guises. We would 
barely remember ourselves as the innocent royal 
daughter we were at the shores of Phoenicia. 
Benumbed by the violence we have involved 
ourselves in, we would hear Aphrodite’s voice 
as from afar. Apparently, she has been in the 
neighbourhood while all this happened to us. 
We would wonder why she, of all gods and 
goddesses, would be in a position to know that 
once we will give our name to a large continent. 
Or, for that matter, that a large continent would 
ever care to carry our name. European identity 
would be the awareness of innocence lost rather 
than the triumph of innocence injured. Who 
inquires about European identity in this way, 
inquires into the Europe of the vowels rather 
than the vocation.
The distinction between a Europe of the 
vocation and a Europe of the vowels was made 
before, I suspect. It resembles one made by 
Merleau-Ponty, in his remarkable contributions 
to the debate on Europe’s identity, closely after 
the Second World War in Geneva. Europe had 
just found itself back on the ruins of everything 
that was destroyed, in particular the meaning 
of words like ‘law’ and ‘human being’. Barely 
capable of surviving, it posed itself a question, 
phrased by a number of intellectuals from East 
and West, from the circles of the vanquished and 
the victors alike. I quote it from the rather solemn 
Introduction to one of the editions of these 
Rencontres internationales27: 
‘(…) the fundamental question about 
the existence of our continent as a spiritual 
reality (…); is there, indeed, a European 
spirit and, if so, what it is according to its 
essence, origin and evolution in the past? 
What does it mean today? And in which 
essentially altered reality dwells this spirit 
and we as its bearers? What is the meaning 
of this spirit and of the peoples, that reflect 
its destiny, for the future?’28 
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Among those who took part in the 
deliberations were famous persons of the 
time, like Julien Benda, Denis de Rougemont, 
George Bernanos, Karl Jaspers, Georg Lukacs, 
Raymond Aron and others. But if one reads 
through the proceedings of the conference, 
it is almost impossible to escape from the 
conclusion that the most incisive insight into 
the relative importance of all these ruminations 
came from the French philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. He argued that the majority 
of the various contributions systematically set 
out from Europe as a representation. From this 
vantage point it is inevitable that the discussion 
will focus on questions like: what is the content 
of this representation? is it pre-conceived in 
the past? should it be realised in the future? 
and, in particular, how can it be characterised 
and distinguished from other, allegedly false, 
representations? Over and against this approach 
of a Europe ‘en représentation’, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests the possibility to reach for unity in a 
Europe ‘en acte’, which is to say: in practical 
ways for men to relate to the world and to each 
other, particularly in the processes of acquiring 
knowledge, performing labour and organising 
a polity.29 Those who goes this way30 – or so 
Merleau-Ponty seems to say – will perhaps escape 
from both Arnheim’s and Ulrich’s camps. They 
will not only steer away from Arnheim’s crypto-
fascism, but also from Ulrich’s non-commitment. 
They will perhaps escape from Nietzsche and his 
diagnosis. For remember that this diagnosis, this 
critique, aimed at precisely the self-representation 
of Europe, and at the self-protection and self-
promotion that inevitably come in its tail. Some, 
Heidegger first and foremost, would even suppose 
that Nietzsche’s own analysis got contaminated 
by what he criticised, to the point where his own 
thought got entangled by representationalism in 
its most radicalist and self-destructive form.31 
Only, it is not so easy to determine what exactly 
Merleau-Ponty meant by his ‘Europe en acte’. 
Certainly, he refers to knowledge, labour, and the 
organisation of society. What comes to the fore, 
in other words, are the praxis of science and its 
concept of truth, the praxis of technology and 
economics as determinative of labour, the praxis 
of politics as the enterprise that shapes society 
into one form or another. But why would these 
praxeis come to the fore? Why would one not 
say that what discloses itself in these practices 
is again this ‘typically European’ substance, 
property or vocation, and therefore, again, 
Europe as representation, as image, as picture of a 
reality already established in an ideal world? The 
answer to this question can profit from reading 
the myth of Europa according to its letters rather 
than its spirit, from the opposite vowels in the 
counterparts ereb and arab. When I now try to 
explain the direction these practices may go, and 
go together in an integrated way, all I do in fact is 
to add some tentative footnotes to a text that was 
written by Merleau-Ponty.
6. The vow of the vowels
One thing is certain: by focussing on 
‘Europe en acte’ we put the question of identity 
in a practical perspective. Now the perspective 
of action is a very specific one. Trivial as it may 
sound, it develops from the agent. Thus, it is the 
perspective developing from someone who looks 
ahead, who assesses the situation on the basis of 
his experience, who scans the causal openings 
in the intricate network of events as they unfold 
themselves, who awaits the right time to act as 
he has decided to do. This perspective is very 
different from the one developing from a spectator, 
who looks back upon his acting in retrospect, 
who assesses its worth with the knowledge that 
is available in hindsight or according to the goals 
that are set afterwards.32 Of course, the two 
are interrelated: one who never looks back will 
never learn from his mistakes and never gather 
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experience. But then again, the perspective of 
action is first and foremost prospective, rather 
than retrospective. It is the perspective of risk and 
venture, in which there will never be a warrant 
that all relevant factors are known, in spite of our 
will to take the best decision ‘everything being 
considered’. It is the perspective that a priori 
justifies prudence as its main virtue. Europe ‘en 
acte’ reminds us, before everything else, of the 
gaze in the unknown future33 that must have been 
in the eyes of the Phoenician king’s daughter, 
when she let herself get involved with the Big 
Greek and was not yet aware of what she was 
about to find out.
If we turn to the practices – or shall we 
say the ad-ventures? – of technology and 
economics, of science and politics, and take 
Europa’s perspective, we have to consider what 
it would mean to view them within a prospective 
framework; a framework that commands the kind 
of prudence that is required if one engages in an 
enterprise that remains risky in spite of one’s 
experience. Soon enough, we will discover that 
a specific type of prudence is required in each of 
the different areas. When it comes to technology, 
prudence could makes us realise that what can be 
made does not set the boundaries of what can be 
thought. When it comes to economics, we may 
become aware of the fact that a thrifty use of scarce 
goods on a global scale cannot be commanded, 
in the final analysis, by offer and demand. The 
market, as a meeting of offer and demand, can 
be an effective instrument to distribute scarcity, 
but it cannot determine the very scarcity it 
presupposes. When it comes to science, we would 
not want to ignore our suspicion that all sorts of 
immunising strategies haunt our received grounds 
of objectivity. When it comes to politics, we 
would be prepared to acknowledge that a political 
enterprise is not possible without presupposing 
a bounded unity that includes people, but at the 
same time excludes other people; and that, by 
definition, it is impossible to justify that very 
boundary within the political entity created by it. 
In short, prudence varies with the specific type of 
venture we engage in as Europeans.
In all of these four different areas it is an 
open question whether the more or less violent 
penetration by the Greek logos will be fertilising 
in the end. Surely Aphrodite made a promise, but 
whether Europa was pleased to hear it, the story 
does not tell. It is part of what we dearly want 
to read as we read in retrospect. If we would be 
willing to really take Merleau-Ponty’s advice, we 
would perhaps be inclined to be more hesitant. We 
would wonder if we did not yield to the seduction 
long ago and, as is usual in such cases, forgot all 
forms of circumspection. Was it all Aphrodite’s 
work from the start? we would wonder. We would 
acknowledge that it happened little by little, like 
the king’s daughter began by allowing herself a 
minor (erotic?) change in her play: she turned, 
as Ovid tells us, to decorating the bull’s, rather 
than her friends’, head with flowers, only to find 
out, soon enough, that she was not in control of 
the situation anymore. Can we say that we are? 
We may have reason to believe that the process 
of European integration has been a clear example 
of ‘Europe en acte’, of prudent and piecemeal 
engineering towards an uncertain future. But 
it is far from anything integrated in all of the 
essentials of social life, and much more similar 
to a uncontrolled gold-rush towards an old Cretan 
dream. We could not care less, or so it seems, 
about the possibly poetic quality of technology, 
about the ecological metabolism conditioning 
economics, about the wisdom that might govern 
science, or about the kind of authority implicitly 
referred to in the exercise of political power. 
Thus, it remains an open question whether, in the 
future, Europe will prove to have given its name 
to a continent. It might just be that this continent 
Europe prematurely appropriated the name of the 
king’s daughter.
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Given this predicament, it becomes important 
to read, once again, the mythology of Europe 
from its etymology, its vow from its vowels. Let 
us be as letter-minded as we can. Europa departed 
from the Phoenician shore, from the borderline 
that separates ereb- from arab-land. But the line 
is a product of thought. It only exists as a function 
of regions that have segregated themselves with 
respect to one another. If ereb and arab are paired 
references to opposite horizons, it must be the 
case that the one can only be used if one situates 
oneself in the domain of the other. Like, from off 
old, one must be in London to hit Oxford Street 
and in Oxford to find London Road, so one can 
only refer to ereb from arab and vice versa. The 
origin of ‘our’ identity lies in what is said about 
us by others.
Thus, a reflection on the role of Europe in 
the ventures mentioned above should start at what 
Europe means in the eyes of non-Europeans, at 
the range of actions or impediments they discover 
in our ventures, and at the terms that seem apt 
to them for expressing these conditions and 
constraints. It is not certain in advance that we 
are going to like these terms. It is not easy to stay 
and listen when we are told that we have built a 
fortress so as to safeguard are own interest first; 
that we stole our energy supplies without properly 
paying for them; that we dumped our garbage 
over the walls of poorer regions rather than 
cleaning it ourselves; or that we chase patterns 
of consumption, mobility and productivity that 
have little to do with what could make humans 
happy. If there is anything contrary to European 
self-confidence, it is the awareness that we 
need a non-European voice in order to discover 
European identity. Alas, it must be said that, 
meanwhile, the arab regions have closed off 
their identity in the rebound of European closure. 
Remember the fatwa that struck Salman Rushdie 
upon the publication of his Satanic Verses. It has 
grown to immense proportions now in all sorts 
of bonds between religious fundamentalism, 
oppression and terror. And it seems to be drifting 
westbound.
There is a last facet that needs to receive 
some light in this footnote to Merleau-Ponty’s 
phrase about ‘Europe en acte’. It has to do with 
a tantalising statement by Mikhail Gorbachev 
in his Oslo 1991 speech, when he received the 
Nobel Prize for Peace.34 He saw ‘the European 
space’ as ‘going beyond its nominal geographical 
boundaries’, reaching from Los Angeles over 
Europe to Vladiwostok. He did not promote this 
as a new enclosure of the northern hemisphere 
to shield off a sort of ‘global Europe’ from the 
rest of the world. But he wanted to join his 
Italian colleague Andreotti in his view that 
‘East-West rapprochement alone is not enough 
for progress of the entire world towards peace. 
However, agreement between them is a great 
contribution to the common cause’; and that it 
entails openness towards other countries and 
regions. Indeed, in a considerable number of 
contexts erep and arab have begun to refer 
to north and south rather than west and east. 
These vowels are variables rather than values. 
It should, perhaps, be taken as a prophecy that 
the original axis of their referential structure 
was in fact in-between these directions: erep-
land in the north-west rather than the west, 
arab-land in the south-east rather than the 
east. But I concede: this is far too good to be 
true on top of all the surmises we have already 
permitted ourselves. And yet, this toppling over 
is a new exhortation to take the myth of Europa 
literally: indeed, Europe will give its name to 
a continent, only it does not know in advance 
which continent. People from Arabian and 
African countries risk their lives on wrecked 
boats to reread these vowels. Europe is the 
continent which is not in a position to know 
yet how erep and arab will topple over in the 
future. Thus, it is not in a position to know yet 
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what will appear to be its opposite horizons; 
Russia? Syria and Irak? Saudi-Arabia? Greece 
itself as it falling out of the Euro-zone? 35 Which 
mirrors it will have to face in order to assess 
its own situation and identity, is impossible to 
know beforehand.36
We undertook a re-reading of the myth of 
Europa, at least part of it and in its simplest form. 
We refrained from exploring all the symbolic 
forces that seemed to radiate from it. We did not, 
for instance, study the fact that Minos, one of the 
two sons borne out of the intercourse between 
Europe and the Great Greek, entered into a 
marriage that generated the man-devouring 
Minotaurus. We have ignored the question how 
Aphrodite acquired her knowledge about the 
future. Was it something only women can know? 
Did she sense that her son, Aeneas the Trojan, 
would come to dwell in Latin surroundings? 
These and many other questions were put aside. 
Instead, we tried not only to re-read, but to 
read in a different way: to trace the vow of the 
myth from its vowels rather than its vocation. 
We tried to detect its meaning by imagining 
ourselves to be Europa, rather than Europa to 
be us. Nietzsche convinced us that this could 
be the only way to shield ourselves from yet 
another exercise in European self-indulgence. 
Merleau-Ponty pointed to an alternative that has 
to be explored in much more detail, but which, at 
least, had the merit of turning our faces into the 
direction in which the story points: a gaze into 
the future. Identity, not as a stubborn repetition 
of the same, but as a prudent unfolding of 
oneself – it is a venture that will cost Europe 
dearly, in terms of time, money and courage.
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36 ‘(...) vielleicht gab es noch niemals ein so «offnes Meer». -’ Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, V, 343.
Bert van Roermund. Eastbound – Westbound: Re-reading the Myth of Europa
Курс на Восток – курс на Запад:  
перечитывая миф о Европе
Берт ван Роермунд
Университет Тилбурга 
Нидерланды
Идентичность Европы не просто оспаривается, оспариваются ее отдельные составляющие. 
Какие именно характеристики (ценности наследие, или род занятий) однозначно 
идентифицируют Европу? По всей видимости, любая позиция, занятая в данной дискуссии, 
приведет к значительным последствиям, например, в отношении внешней политики (следует 
ли Евросоюзу включить Турцию в свой состав?) или внутренней институционализации 
(существует ли европейский народ?). Все эти доводы, без исключения, вытекают из 
представлений о прошлом Европы. В настоящей статье оспариваются общепринятые 
утверждения, исходя из различий между ‘Europe en représentation’ и ‘Europe en acte’, на 
которые указывал Мерло-Понти. Прежде всего, исследуется, как повествование о прошлом 
Европы растворяется в мифе, который мы не можем воспроизвести, но от которого не в 
силах избавиться. Во-вторых, рассматривается резкая критика репрезентационного взгляда 
на Европу, которую нам приводит Ницше. Здесь автор впервые обращается к точным, но 
достаточно противоречивым заметкам Ницше; далее анализируется, как те же самые темы 
отражены в одном из величайших, по мнению автора, романов о Европе ХХ века, «Человек 
без свойств» Роберта Музиля). В-третьих, в статье утверждается, что альтернативное 
понимание идентичности в рамках ‘Europe en acte’ позволяет развернуть миф о Европе в 
перспективе, а не в ретроспективе, принимая во внимание сценарии, по которым различные 
страны в рамках Евросоюза потеряли свою идентичность, чтобы объединиться для 
благоразумного решения трех основных задач будущего: развития технологий, экономики и 
верховенства закона. Следовательно, дискуссия об идентичности должна больше опираться 
на коллективную индивидуальность, чем коллективное единообразие. 
Ключевые слова: европейская идентичность, индивидуальность и единообразие, 
взаимоотношения Востока и Запада, политические границы, Ницше.
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